Introduction
This proposal was originally a short paper relating representations of intelligence between three fields: psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). I particularly emphasize the role of modularity in these three areas. To my knowledge, this paper was never published -it was written on commission, but several years ago and I have just done yet another web search to find it. Further, that editor is already sitting on a longer and more polished paper that he's had even longer! Anyway, this paper contains a lot of ideas that I would love to research further and work out in better detail.
This paper has in common with my original DAM paper the emphasis on modularity and how it can be coordinated into a coherent humanoid intelligence. However, it does not go into great detail on my own development methodology (BOD) because that has already been published in detail in a number of locations. Since the emphasis on designing a mind is no longer present in this book, I think this is appropriate. I could, however, easily say more about language (and memetics) than I have here -bringing socially evolved intelligent behavior to the individual in a reasonable amount of time and complexity.
Modularity in Artificial Intelligence
The paper that made up the bulk of this proposal didn't bother to review modularity in AI, because most of the workshop participants were familiar with that and I was only allowed 4 pages. This brief history is yet again taken from another paper (sorry, I'm in a hurry today!) In the actual chapter I would shorten this and make it more uniform with the rest of the abstract. I have already written at length on this topic a couple of time elsewhere (Bryson, 2000 (Bryson, , 2001 , I think the application to biology and the overall relationship to cognitive phenomena mentioned in the following sections are much more interesting.
Modules for Perception
I will begin with Fodor's "The Modularity of Mind" (Fodor, 1983) , both because it introduces many of the concepts familiar to BBAI, and because it presents a theory of intelligence decomposition which is still actively researched in the natural sciences today (e.g. Coltheart, 1999; Flombaum et al., 2002; Spelke, ress) 1 .
Fodor introduces the terms "horizontal" vs. "vertical" to describe two different sorts of decomposition of intelligence. Horizontal decompositions for Fodor are those which identify processes (e.g. memory, attention, perception, judgment) which underlie all of cognition. Vertical decompositions identify particular skills or faculties (e.g. mathematics, language, metaphysics) which each have their own characteristic processes of memory, attention and so forth. Roughly speaking, evidence for horizontal decomposition is the extent to which performance across domains is correlated for a particular individual; evidence for vertical decomposition is the extent to which it is not.
Fodor himself believes that part of human intelligence is decomposed in this vertical sense; that part being perception. In Fodor's system, a number of semi-autonomous perceptual modules run simultaneously giving quick, automatic analysis of the perceptual scene. Each module recognizes its own best input, and effectively trumps the other modules when it is best utilized. The output of modules is in the language of thought, which is operated on by a horizontal reasoning system that then produces action.
Modules as Agents
Another modular theory immediately precursing BBAI was the "Society of Mind" (Doyle, 1983; Minsky, 1985 ). Minsky's proposal is more substantially vertical than Fodor's, although it still has some horizontal elements. An individual's actions are determined by simpler individual agencies, which are effectively specialists in particular domains. Minsky's agencies exploit hierarchy for organization, so for example the agency of play is composed of agencies of block-play, doll-play and so forth. Arbitration between agencies is also hierarchical, so the play agency competes with the food agency for the individual's attention. Once play establishes control, the block and doll agencies compete.
Minsky's agents have both perception and action, but not memory, which is managed by another network of agencies of a different sort. Memory (K) agencies are interconnected both with each other and with the other, actor (S) agents; each can activate the other. Keeping the whole system working requires another horizontal faculty: the "B brain" which monitors the main (A) brain for internally obvious problems such as redundancy or feedback cycles. Minsky's model relates to BBAI mostly as a series of contrasts: it attempts to account for all of human intelligence, but has never been fully implemented.
Modules as Finite State Machines
In contrast, the term "behavior-based artificial intelligence" was invented to describe a simplified but fully-implemented system used to control multiple, robotic agents. This was the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986 (Brooks, , 1991b . The subsumption architecture is purely vertical. The modules were originally finite state machines, and arbitration between them was conducted exclusively by wires connecting the modules -originally literally, eventually as encoded in software. Each wire could connect one module to another's input or output wires, the signal of which the first module could then either monitor, suppress or overwrite.
Brooks initially asserted that most apparent horizontal faculties (e.g. memory, judgment, attention, reasoning) were actually abstractions emergent from an agent's expressed behavior, but had no place in the agent's actual control (Brooks, 1991b, p. 146-147) . However, his system was rapidly extended to have learning systems either inside modules or local to layers of modules (e.g. Matarić, 1990; Brooks, 1991a) . Unfortunately, this promising approach was apparently smothered by the attractive simplicity and radicalism of his deemphasis on representation and centralized control.
Modules as Slaves and Bitmaps
Of the researchers who did not immediately adopt "no representation" as a mantra, most attributed the impressive success of Brooks approach to the fact that he had created abstracted primitivesthe action/perception units. Because these primitive units could sort out many of the details of a problem themselves, they made the composition of intelligence under any approach relatively easy (Malcolm et al., 1989) . Thus behavior systems were incorporated as a component into a large variety of AI architectures which still maintained centralized, logic-based planning and learning systems (e.g. Gat, 1991; Bonasso et al., 1997) . In fact, due to the difficulty of reasoning about relatively autonomous components, some systems reduced behaviors to "fuzzy rules" (Konolige and Myers, 1998) or vector spaces (Arkin, 1998) which could be easily composed.
Despite the lack of commonality of such approaches to Brooks' original ideal, they are still often called either behavior-based or hybrid behavior-based systems. Further, by the late nineties, the work of these researchers had so far outstripped that of the "pure" BBAI researchers that two significant publications declared this hybrid approach to have been demonstrated superior to nonhybrid ones (Hexmoor et al., 1997; Kortenkamp et al., 1998) .
Agents as Modules
In some senses, multi-agent systems (MAS) are actually closer to BBAI than these hybrid behaviorbased systems. Each agent performs a particular task, and may have its own private knowledge store and representations which are presumably well suited to its function. However, to date there are fundamental differences between a MAS and a single, modular agent. These differences are due to issues of communication and arbitration between modules / agents. The MAS community is concerned with interoperability between unspecified numbers and types of agents, and with distribution across multiple platforms. This creates an administrative overhead not necessary for a single, modular agent 2 .
Modularity in Psychology
I will begin with an incredibly simple definition of modularity from the psychological literature, due to Flombaum et al. (2002) : "Modularity is the thesis that the mind contains independent input systems that, when engaged, are restricted in the types of information that they can consult." This definition is useful for two reasons. First, it introduces a very clean criteria for modularity: that some part of the mind does not have access to some other part of the mind. Given this simple criteria, anyone who accepts the idea of implicit knowledge or unconscious action has already acknowledged that there is some sort of modularity involved in human intelligence.
The second reason this quote is useful is the phrase "independent input systems". This makes clear the origins of a great deal of the theory underlying modularity in the psychological literature -The Modularity of Mind by Fodor (1983) . Although Fodor states that he believes modularity may also exist in motor systems (p. 42) he claims ignorance of these systems and concentrates on perception. An entire school of research has followed this lead (recently Coltheart, 1999; Downing et al., 2001; Spelke, ress) .
Even if Fodorian psychology research did consider motor as well as perceptual modules, it would never consider the sorts of tightly-coupled perception-motor modules prevalent in artificial intelligence (e.g. Minsky, 1985; Brooks, 1991b; Albus, 1997) . This is because, for Fodor, the purpose of modules is to translate the complexity of raw sensory input into a common representation used by a general-purpose reasoning system which chooses the course of action. Presumably, Fodorian motor modules would translate similarly generic instructions into the complexity of muscular control.
Fodor believes that the mind is constructed of both vertical capacities, the afore-mentioned modules specialized to task, and horizontal capacities, things like the general-purpose reasoning system. At this high level, his theory is consistent with some AI work. For example, although Minsky (1985) describes single modules (or 'agents') capable of sensing, planning and action, he also describes memory systems and organizational structures (e.g. the B-brain) which are accessible to or have access to all agents. PRS and three-layered architectures (e.g. Georgeff and Lansky, 1987; Bonasso et al., 1997 ) also have both perception/action modules and monolithic elements such as planners.
Modularity in Brains
I would now like to turn from psychology to neuroscience. We have evidence of at least three sorts of modular decomposition in mammal brains 3 .
Modularity by organ
We know that different parts of the central nervous system have radically different structure, in terms of different component cells, different amounts of connectivity, and different organizations of connectivity. Even if we did not have behavioral evidence (as we do) that the neocortex, cerebellum, hippocampus and so forth perform different functions, we would suspect as materialists and computer scientists that these organs must perform different computations, because of their different structure. This point becomes more obvious when we realize there is no particular reason not to extend it to more peripheral organs, such as the spinal cord, the retina or the cochlea.
Modularity by region
Even within an organ which is fairly structurally homogeneous (at least in considerations likely to affect the nature of its computations) there are differences in function. In some cases these seem to be determined primarily by connectivity: for example, the primary auditory and visual cortices are areas of the neocortex that most directly receive the sensory input of the two systems. It has been suggested that other regions are modular by function, such as the 'fusiform face area' or the 'parahippocampal place area' (Downing et al., 2001) . However, given the amazing diversity of cortical computation even in single regions (e.g. Kauffman et al., 2002) , it may be that such apparent specialization also reflects connectivity, this time toward subcortical brain organs specialized for purposes such as social interaction and navigation (the amygdalic and hippocampal systems respectively.) Some cortical regions are steps along a stream of processing, e.g. regions dedicated to identifying low-level features such as line orientations (Hubel, 1988 ), or to higher-level concepts such as categories of objects or tasks (Freedman et al., 2001) or personal identity (Perrett et al., 1992) .
Modularity by context
Even within a given region, the semantics of a particular cell's firing seems to be dependent on the context in which it fires. This has been demonstrated in the hippocampus (Kobayashi et al., 1997) , in sensory cortices mapping receptive fields (Sen et al., 2001) , and in the prefrontal cortex (Asaad et al., 2000) . I believe that the extent of the consequences of this temporal modularity have not been fully recognized. It may be that some computations are mutually exclusive because their representations cannot be active at the same time. Further, individual differences in developing these representations (Skaggs and McNaughton, 1998 , e.g.) might account for individual differences in insight and generalization based on the relative accessibility of two representations.
Discussion
I would argue that modularity by region could be considered analogous to Fodor's vertical capacities, the things he calls 'modules.' They also correspond to AI behaviors, as proposed by Brooks (1991b) , and used widely in modular AI. However, it may take a stream of several cortical areas (for example) to correspond to one Fodorian module, and an even longer stream of processing to create a full Brooksian behavior connecting perception to action.
Modularity by organ is a more analogous to horizontal capacity -organs are often specialized to task rather than perceptual domain and help the agent as a whole. On the other hand, there are many more organs, and their functioning more intertwined with the regular modules, than I think either Fodor or three-layered agent architectures imply. For example, a great deal of semantic knowledge seems to be stored in specialized cortical regions rather than being associated tightly with a planner as is the model of PRS. Minsky's 'Society of Mind' or Soar (Newell, 1990) might be closer models of this knowledge distribution, but neither of these systems have as many sorts of specialized processing as the brain has dedicated organs.
Temporal modularity -modularity by context -is not generally shown in modular AI; it has more in common with traditional computing systems. Modular AI systems tend to have all modules operating continuously in parallel. However, Soar has always had the notion of problem space to constrain search to a particular context (Laird and Rosenbloom, 1996) . Developers of a related but simpler system, ACT-R, tried to do away with problem spaces in order to simplify the system, but found them necessary for successful problem-solving (Anderson and Matessa, 1998).
Module Coordination and Structured Action Selection
My own AI research has been into the management and design of modular AI. I have come to the conclusion that 1. Semantic and task memory should be stored in specialized representations within behaviors (perception/action vertical modules), and 2. ordering the behavior of such modules is best done using a specialized, horizontal module for sequencing behavior.
This sequencing module is not a full planning system, but rather a system for running established reactive plans (see Bryson and Stein, 2001a , for further details). I believe that this behavior sequencing is directed by a number of specialized organs in mammals. For example, the affective forebrain systems including the amygdala help redirect attention out of a complex plan sequence in response to urgent environmental stimuli such as loud noises. The amygdala can also learn to respond to frequently salient stimuli such as particular sounds, people or rooms. The basal ganglia has recently been implicated in arbitrating between competing subsystems (Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al., 1999) . The periaqueductal gray has been implicated in action sequencing for complex, species-typical tasks (Carlson, 2000; Lonstein and Stern, 1997) .
Other horizontal / organ-based biological modules that I believe would have useful analogs for AI systems include the cerebellum, which provides dynamic smoothing between discrete position targets, and the hippocampus, which seems to provide for both episodic memory and task learning (see further discussion in Bryson and Stein, 2001b) .
Deliberation
Deliberation, or conscious attention to a task, still seems deeply mysterious to me. Although I have been studying planning and modularity with an eye to biological plausibility for over a decade, and although the accessibility difference that determines explicit from implicit knowledge is a key indicator of modularity 4 , I still see no systematic difference (other than qualia) between conscious and unconscious thought other than a marked increase in cortical activity (Dehaene et al., 2001 (Dehaene et al., , 1998 .
I am not convinced that consciousness is isomorphic with having self-knowledge, although clearly having a good representation of oneself is useful to planning. Nor is it with having language, although language may fundamentally alter the nature of consciousness, both by allowing shorthand concept reference in what is clearly a limited capacity system, and by increasing coherence as a consequence of language's sequential temporal nature (Spelke, ress) . But I could easily construct an AI straw-being that might have either or both of these attributes but not seem particularly more alive or aware than any other AI system.
Most intriguing to me are a number of recent results showing that:
1. humans can learn complex tasks without explicitly understanding them and further 2. humans who do gain an explicit understanding show no performance difference from those who do not (Siemann and Delius, 1993; Bechara et al., 1995; Greene et al., 2001 ).
I suspect two things. First, that Dennett (2001) is absolutely right in thinking that, as we come to understand consciousness, we'll realize we have been covering several disparate functions with that one term, none of which are magic, and second, that two of these functions will be focusing search and ordering behavior in time.
